The relationship between Communist Party and State has been the object of substantial work among Chinese and foreign academics. But perhaps more interesting is the emerging relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and private enterprises operating within the parameters of Chinese socialism. This presents not merely another facet of law with Chinese characteristics, but also another aspect of the way in which polycentricity has become more naturalized even within the domestic legal orders of strong states.
I have posited that the old boundaries between public and private law have been giving way to new and more complex polychromatic relationships between state and other transnational enterprises, principally those operating in corporate form. (Backer, Larry Catá, "The Structure of Global Law: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity," 17(2) Tilburg Law Review 177-199 (2012). Chinese state and Communist Party authorities have begun to act on this understanding, both in the construction of internal policy and in the development of policy for the effective intervention int he construction of mulch-sourced governance frameworks.Patrick Boehler recently reported that "Beijing has for the first time established an advisory council of multinational heavyweights to help the leadership keep a finger on the pulse of major corporations in vital industries. . . . The mechanism will gove Bejing a platform to directly lobby influential multinational leaders across different sectors in future trade disputes." Patrick Boehler, "Beijing Sets Up Multinationals Advisory Body," South China Morning Post, June 7, 2013.
This approach stands in marked contrast to similar efforts to leverage international softy power by Norway. (Backer, Larry Catá, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Legislative Power: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets 29 American University International Law Review – (forthcoming 2013)(November 18, 2012). Yet in both cases, the state is seeking to leverage public power through private markets. In China, as in Norway, that leveraging involves active participation i corporate governance. While the Norwegians pursue this goal through their active shareholder policy, the CCP has deepened their policy of integrating Party work and education within corporate governance. In this way, state and enterprise are connected seamlessly through the mediating force of the CCP, the way in which the Party stands as the nexus poiint between domestic and foreign policy. (Backer, Larry Catá and Wang, Keren, 'What is China's Dream?' Hu Angang Imagines China in 2020 as the First Internationally Embedded Superpower (February 23, 2013). Consortium for Peace & Ethics Working Paper No. 2013-2). But in the case of enterprise power within globalization, that seamlessness requires recognition of distinct governance spheres, one public and the other private.
I will be writing more about this in the context of the Chinese system in future posts. In this introduction, I present a translation of a basic document of CCP policy--the “Opinions on Improving and Strengthening Party Organization’s Construction in Non-SOEs (Temporary)” People’s daily 2012 May 25th.
(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2013)
I have posited that the old boundaries between public and private law have been giving way to new and more complex polychromatic relationships between state and other transnational enterprises, principally those operating in corporate form. (Backer, Larry Catá, "The Structure of Global Law: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity," 17(2) Tilburg Law Review 177-199 (2012). Chinese state and Communist Party authorities have begun to act on this understanding, both in the construction of internal policy and in the development of policy for the effective intervention int he construction of mulch-sourced governance frameworks.Patrick Boehler recently reported that "Beijing has for the first time established an advisory council of multinational heavyweights to help the leadership keep a finger on the pulse of major corporations in vital industries. . . . The mechanism will gove Bejing a platform to directly lobby influential multinational leaders across different sectors in future trade disputes." Patrick Boehler, "Beijing Sets Up Multinationals Advisory Body," South China Morning Post, June 7, 2013.
This approach stands in marked contrast to similar efforts to leverage international softy power by Norway. (Backer, Larry Catá, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Legislative Power: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets 29 American University International Law Review – (forthcoming 2013)(November 18, 2012). Yet in both cases, the state is seeking to leverage public power through private markets. In China, as in Norway, that leveraging involves active participation i corporate governance. While the Norwegians pursue this goal through their active shareholder policy, the CCP has deepened their policy of integrating Party work and education within corporate governance. In this way, state and enterprise are connected seamlessly through the mediating force of the CCP, the way in which the Party stands as the nexus poiint between domestic and foreign policy. (Backer, Larry Catá and Wang, Keren, 'What is China's Dream?' Hu Angang Imagines China in 2020 as the First Internationally Embedded Superpower (February 23, 2013). Consortium for Peace & Ethics Working Paper No. 2013-2). But in the case of enterprise power within globalization, that seamlessness requires recognition of distinct governance spheres, one public and the other private.
I will be writing more about this in the context of the Chinese system in future posts. In this introduction, I present a translation of a basic document of CCP policy--the “Opinions on Improving and Strengthening Party Organization’s Construction in Non-SOEs (Temporary)” People’s daily 2012 May 25th.




